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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Questions Presented By Petitioner:
1.

Whether the court of appeals correctly reversed the jury

verdict of no causation on grounds unrelated to the verdict or the
issues raised by the parties.
2.

Whether the court of appeals correctly ruled that jury

instructions

16a and 21a regarding proof

of negligence

and

proximate cause misstate Utah law and require a new trial.
Additional Question from Plaintiff-Respondent:
3.

Whether the Court of Appeals

fundamentally

prejudicial

rulings

correctly

throughout

ruled that
the

trial,

instructions requiring the jury to ignore plaintiff's experts'
testimony and plaintiff's theory of the casef

and failure to

instruct the jury on plaintiff's theory of the case required a new
trial.
4.

Whether this Court should grant Certiorari.

OPINIONS BELOW
LDS Hospital's Petition for Writ of Certiorari challenges the
decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in George v. LDS Hospital.
142 U.A.R. 27 (Utah App. 1990).

That opinion is appended to this

memorandum at Appendix pages 1-10.

References will be made to the

Appendix.

JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to review the court of appeals
decision by a writ of certiorari pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-22(3) (a) and (5) .

CONTROLLING AUTHORITIES
Utah Rules

of Civil

Procedure,
2

Rule 51 [App. 26-28]

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff-respondent filed a negligence action against Dr.
Kimball Lloyd, Dr. Michael Lahey and LDS Hospital.

A settlement

was reached with the physicians prior to trial.

At trial,

plaintiff claimed that the hospital's negligence and failure to
procure obviously necessary medical care was a substantial factor,
or

contributing

proximate

cause

subsequent death of Betty George.

of the

cardiac

arrest

and

Though "present" at trial, no

evidence was introduced regarding the physicians' standard of care
or its breach.
The jury returned a Special Verdict finding the physicians
were not negligent, that LDS Hospital was 100% negligent, but that
said negligence was not the proximate cause of the death of Betty
George.

Plaintiff's Motion for a New trial was denied, and the

case was appealed.

On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed

and remanded for a new trial, finding that fundamentally unfair
rulings had deprived the plaintiff-respondent of a fair trial,
that the jury had been improperly instructed to ignore plaintiff's
expert evidence and theory of the case, and that the jury had been
improperly instructed on causation.

[App.1-10]

The verdict of no

cause of action against the physicians was properly affirmed.
[Id.

at 9]

Because of the reversal on these bases, the Court of

Appeals did not reach other errors claimed by the plaintiffrespondent.

[Id.

at 10]

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Plaintiff-respondent

agrees

with,

and

incorporates

reference the f a c t s found by the Utah Court of Appeals.
3]
3

by

[App. 2-

ARGUMENT
POINT I: NO LEGITIMATE REASON TO GRANT
CERTIORARI EXISTS IN THIS CASE.
Under Rule 4 6, Rules

of

the

Utah Supreme

Court,

certiorari is

a matter of judicial discretion to be granted only when there are
"special and important reasons" to do so.

LDS Hospital contends

that the Court of Appeals "so far departed from the usual course
of judicial proceedings" as to require the exercise this Court's
power of supervision; and that the issues decided by the court of
appeals were "important questions of first impression" which
should be settled by this Court.

[Brief of Petitioner at 6-7]

Neither position is accurate.
LDS Hospital implies that just before leaving the bench,
Judge Davidson went off on a wild tangent in his final decision,
and rendered an opinion which was completely foreign to the issues
before the court of appeals.

fnl

[Brief of Petitioner at 2]

The

suggestion overlooks the fact that the decision of the Court of
Appeals was unanimous,

with Judge Orme and Judge Bench concurring.

Nor did the trial of this matter, or its appeal, involve any
questions of first impression.

The case was garden variety

medical negligence, and not very complicated.

No physicians were

involved, nor did plaintiff-respondent raise any issue involving
medical diagnosis or treatment.

Medical malpractice is simply a

professional tort, governed by long established legal principles,
fnl

LDS hospital also implies that it was prejudiced by Judge Davidson's
absence at oral argument. LDS Hospital fails to mention that Judge Orme
stated before argument that Judge Davidson, who would write the decision,
would be provided tapes of the argument. Petitioner was offered the
opportunity to argue before a full panel, but declined.

4

and this case was no more than one involving the professional duty
of hospital staff, its breach, and the result of that breach.
In any eventf as developed belowf this case was properly
reversed and remanded, quite apart from any technical legal
issues, on the basis of fundamental unfair and prejudicial rulings
of the trial court which deprived plaintiff-respondent of a fair
trial.

POINT II:

PETITIONER MATERIALLY MISSTATES OR
MISUNDERSTANDS THE ISSUES
DETERMINED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS.

It is axiomatic, that each party is entitled to have the jury
instructed on its theory of the case if there is evidence to

support it. Pacific Chroroalox Division v. lreyf 787 p.2d 1319
(Utah App. 1990); Carpet S a m v. State of Utah, 786 P.2d 770 (Utah
App. 1990).
correctly

The decision of the court of appeals in this case,
distilled, was that the

jury was prohibited

from

considering plaintiff-respondent's theory of liability, when the
trial court added instructions 16a and 21a. [App.6-9]

Reversible

error was manifest since those instructions fundamentally altered
the plaintiff-respondent's burden of proof after

both parties had

rested.

the

Plaintiff-respondent's

theory

for

hospital's

liability had been completely accepted by the district court
throughout the trial.

Plaintiff-respondent's experts had been

duly qualified and allowed to present evidence on duty, breach and
causation.

The last-minute instructions required the jury to

ignore plaintiff-respondent's expert testimony, and much of his
evidence.

[App.6-7]

5

Rather than having "totally missed the major issue" [Brief of
Petitioner at 8], the decision of the Court of Appeals goes right
to the heart of the matter, specifically, that plaintiff-appellant
was denied a fair trial.

The relevant facts, briefly stated are

as follows:
1.

Plaintiff-respondent's case at trial was solely

against LDS Hospital and its nursing and respiratory therapy
staff;
2.

Plaintiff-respondent's

called

a

nurse

and

respiratory therapist who were duly qualified as experts to
testify regarding duty, breach of duty, and proximate
3.

cause.

The trial court ruled repeatedly during the trial

that the proximate

cause

of

Betty

George's

death

on August 4,

198 6, as opposed to the cause of her cardiac arrest on August 2,
1986, was irrelevant.
4.

[App. at 6, fn.3]

The trial court specifically ruled, and instructed

all counsel that it would permit no experts to be called on the
issue of proximate cause of death.

[Id.,

see

alsof

App. 11-16,

which is Addendum II from plaintiff-respondent's opening brief
before the court of appeals.

This addendum sets forth the trial

court's rulings verbatim, from the record.]
5.
objections,

The

trial

subsequently

court,

over

permitted

plaintiff-respondent's
completely

speculative

testimony from three defense experts on that very issue.

[App.7-

8]
6.

On the last day of trial, after both sides had

rested, the trial court inserted instruction 16a, which had been
specifically rejected the day before, and the previously unheard
6

of instruction 21a.

These required plaintiff-respondent to prove

proximate cause of death through the testimony of a physician or
lose.

[App.17-19]
Contrary to petitioner's implication, the court of appeals

decision was based precisely on the major issue before it. The
decision states:
Defendant counters that an expert witness cannot
testify about an area of medicine in which he or
she is not personally familiar. The record clearly
indicates, however, that Gillerman and Owings
testified only to the standards of care in their
respective fields.
The trial court recognized
these witnesses as experts and admitted their
testimony, yet the court, through the jury
instructions, prevented the jury from considering
their testimony. [App.6]
The testimony of these experts completely covered plaintiffrespondent's burden of proof, including the standard of care, its
breach and damages proximately caused thereby.

As the Court of

Appeals held:
This error was compounded by the court consistently
stating throughout the trial that cause of death
was not an issue in the case and that expert
testimony need not address that subject, only to
give the jury instruction focusing on causation as
established by medical testimony. [Id. at fn.3]
In a subsequent section of its decision entitled PROXIMATE
CAUSE, the court of appeals correctly set forth law establishing
that the question of whether the negligence of a hospital staff
was a contributing proximate cause of a patient's injuries, is one
of fact for the jury, then specifically held:
A jury could have reasonably concluded that the
failure of the nurses to notify Dr. Lloyd or Dr.
Lahey of Mrs. George's change in condition
prevented them from diagnosing, treating and
possibly saving her life, and that this failure
therefore was a proximate cause of her worsened
condition and ensuing death. [App.9]
7

This was exactly the position taken by plaintiff-respondent
throughout trial and the appeals process, including briefs and
argument.

LDS

Hospital

plays

a game

of

semantics

with

its

position that the court of appeals decision focuses on standard of
care, rather than the proximate cause.

The emphasis placed by the

court of appeals on the causation issue is patent, and turns on
the

grossly prejudicial

instructions

which had

the

effect

of

improperly directing a verdict for LDS Hospital on that issue.
A.

GRANTING LDS HOSPITAL'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE SINCE THE COURT OF APPEALS DID
NOT REACH SEVERAL OF THE ISSUES RAISED BY PLAINTIFFRESPONDENT .

Petitioner claims "there is no basis for a new trial", and
asks this Court to grant Certiorari to "dispel the confusion"
supposedly created by the decision of the court of appeals. [Brief
of Petitioner at 20]

As petitioner correctly

states however,

because the Court of Appeals reversed an remanded the case for a
new trial based on plaintiff-respondent's primary argument [Brief
of Petitioner at 6 ] , it did not reach other less critical but
equally reversible errors by the district court.
that

reason,

granting

certiorari

would

be

[App.10]

improvident

numerous issues that were appealed remain unresolved.

For
since

Far better,

in terms of both fairness and judicial economy to have the case
correctly re-tried.
1.

The unresolved errors include:

Plaintiff's claim of error that the Special Verdict

form, provided over plaintiff-respondent's objections, completely
eliminated any possibility for the jury to consider plaintiff's
claim of very substantial injuries and damage which occurred
to the death of Betty George.

8

prior

2.

The district court's failure to instruct the jury on

plaintiff-respondent's "increased risk" or "lost chance" theories
for recovery.
3.

of plaintiff-respondent's

well-

supported position that, under the facts of this casef no

expert

testimony

The

rejection

should have been necessary to establish causation

against the hospital.
4. The district court's error in allowing the hospital's
"experts" to testify at all, after having previously ruled that
such testimony would not be permitted.
5.

Plaintiff-respondent's

claim of error that the

testimony of the hospital's "experts" was completely speculative
and without foundation.
6.

Plaintiff-respondent's claim that the district court

erred by failing to direct a verdict in favor of defendants, Dr.
Lloyd and Dr. Lahey, after the close of the evidence.
7.

Plaintiff-respondent's claim that the district court

erred by refusing to allow plaintiff an opportunity for rebuttal
after defendant's closing argument. [See, App.20-21, which is
plaintiff-respondent's STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, before the court
of appeals.]
The

first

item on this

Plaintiff-respondent

list warrants

further comment.

introduced extensive unrebutted proof at

trial that Betty George suffered incredible pain, mental and
emotional anguish prior to her cardiac arrest on August 2, 1986.
The jury had no difficulty with the abominable lack of care
provided

by

negligent.

the

hospital

staff,

finding

LDS

Hospital 100%

Plaintiff requested that the jury be allowed to
9

separately

determine

the

damages

suffered

by

Betty

George

personally, which go to the Estate under U.C.A. §78-11-12, from
the legally distinct damages to her heirs under Utah's wrongful
death statute. U.C.A. §78-11-7/

See, Switzer v. Reynolds. 606

P.2d 244 (Utah 1980).
However, question #3 on the Special Verdict, directed the
jury to answer no further questions if it answered "no" to the
question of whether the hospital's negligence was a proximate
cause of Betty George's death. [App.22-25]
made it impossible

The Special verdict

for the jury to award damages for substantial

pre-death injuries which had been conclusively proved.
Under these circumstances, any alteration of the order for a
new trial would constitute a de facto

decision on these other

significant issues not directly decided by the court of appeals.
Justice, fairness and substantial issues of judicial economy
require that the petition for a writ of certiorari be denied.

POINT III:

LDS HOSPITAL'S ARGUMENT ON THE LAW
IS BOTH IMPROPER AND INCORRECT.

LDS Hospital apparently views a Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari as an opportunity to re-argue its failed positions on
appeal.

Many issues are improperly

raised, and may not be

included as a basis for granting certiorari.
A.

THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER TO GRANT CERTIORARI MUST BE
STRICTLY LIMITED TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Rule 4 9 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, sets forth
the requirements of a Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
provides, in relevant part:
10

The rule

(a)
Contents.
certiorari shall
indicated:

The petition for a writ of
contain, in the order here

(4) The questions presented for review, expressed
in the terms and circumstances of the case but
without unnecessary detail. The statement of the
questions should be short and concise and should
not be argumentative or repetitious.
General
conclusory statements such as "the decision of the
Court of Appeals is not supported by the law or
facts," are not acceptable.
The statement
of a

question presented will be deemed to comprise every
subsidiary
question fairly included therein.
Only
the questions set forth in the petition
or
fairly
included therein will be considered by the Court.
(emphasis added)

The questions presented for review by LDS Hospital were:
1. Whether the court of appeals correctly reversed
the jury verdict of no causation on grounds
unrelated to the verdict or the issues raised by
the parties.
2
Whether the court of appeals correctly ruled
that jury instructions 16a and 21a regarding proof
of negligence and proximate cause misstate Utah law
and require a new trial.
These clearly are "general conclusory statements" and an
insufficient basis on which to grant the Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari.
LDS Hospital also raised arguments in its Petition which are
not fairly included in the general issues presented.

For example,

at pages 15-16 and 18 of the Petition, LDS Hospital complains that
plaintiff-respondentfs objections were not adequately preserved at
trial.

Since this question was not specifically set forth, and is

not "fairly included" in the issues presented for review, it
should not be considered as a basis for granting certiorari.
B.

THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY CONSIDERED INSTRUCTIONS
16a AND 21a AS A BASIS FOR REVERSAL.

LDS Hospital alleges that plaintiff-respondent's failure to
object to instructions both given and refused should preclude the
11

Court of Appeal's reversal on that basis.
briefed and argued.
Rule 51, Utah

The issue was fully

Plaintiff-respondent took the position under

R.Civ.P,

that he was prevented by prejudicial

judicial proceedings from making a timely objection on the record,
and that, in any event, a review of the trial court's instructions
was required "in the interests of justice."

The Court of Appeals

quite apparently agreed, and/or determined, in its discretion
under Rule 51, to review the errors complained of.
Since Petitioner made no showing that the Court of Appeals
abused

its

discretion

instructions, that

in

reviewing

the

erroneous

issue can not be the basis

jury

for granting

certiorari.
C.

LDS HOSPITAL MISSTATES THE LAW REGARDING PROOF OF
CAUSATION.
1. In a Negligence Action Solely Against a Hospital
Testimony from a Physician on Causation is Not Required.

LDS Hospital continues to insist
plaintiff-respondent

could

testimony of a physician.

only prove

in its Petition, that
causation

through the

That position was rejected throughout

the trial by the district

court, which specifically

allowed

plaintiff's nurse and respiratory therapist to testify as experts
on causation.

The very same issue was fully briefed and argued at

length before the court of appeals which also ruled against the
hospital in its well reasoned and legally supported decision.
The simple fact of the matter is that no Utah case has ever

held, in an action

solely

against

a hospital

and its

staff,

that

testimony from a physician is required to establish causation.
Plaintiff-respondent's

case

(as

opposed

to

LDS

Hospital's

defense), had nothing to do with medical diagnosis and treatment.
12

The case had nothing to do with the

the

result

exercised

of

surgery,

ordinary

care.

or

scientific

whether

the

effect

of

medicine,

attending

physician

Fredrickson v. Maw. 119 Utah 385, 227

P.2d 772, 773 (1951); Brief of Petitioner at 13.
Plaintiff-respondent's

duty in this case was to provide

expert testimony on the standard of care and its breach, which he
convincingly did.

At that point, the issue of whether the

hospital's negligence resulting in a complete failure to provide
necessary care was a contributing cause, or a substantial factor
in the patient's subsequent arrest and death, should have been one
of fact

for the jury. fn2

The court of appeals agreed with numerous courts from other
jurisdictions which had considered that specific issue and found
that physician testimony was not a necessary requirement to
establish causation.

See, e.g., cases cited with approval by the

Utah Court of Appeals in George 1L* LH£ Hospital
including:

[App.7-8],

Utter v. United Hospital Center. 236 S.E.2d 213, 216

(w.va. 1977); Campbell v. Fitt County Memorial Hospital/ 352
S.E.2d 902, 908-09 (N.C.App. 1987); Karricran v . Nazareth Covenant

$ Academy, 510 P.2d 190, 196 (Kan. 1973); Darling v,
Community
1965);

Hospital,

Goff

(Cal.App,

v.

Charleston

33 111.2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 2 5 3 , 258 ( 1 1 1 .

Doctor's

General

1958), and see g e n e r a l l y ,

33 Baylor L.Rev. 109 (1981).

Hospital.
Morris,

333 P . 2 d 29,

The Negligent

33

Nurse,

A p p e l l a n t ' s Opening B r i e f , and Reply

B r i e f b e f o r e t h e c o u r t of a p p e a l s c o n t a i n d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n s of
many o t h e r c a s e s and a u t h o r i t i e s . t o t h e same e f f e c t .
fn2

This Court need not dwell on this issue, since the court of appeals found
that plaintiff-appellant had produced sufficient, competent expert testimony
on causation. [App.6-7]
13

Regardless

of

whether

this

point

may

be

legitimately

disputed, it is nevertheless prejudicial, reversible error for the
district court to have conducted the trial under rules prohibiting
the plaintiff-respondent

from attempting

to prove

causation

through a physician, and subsequently instructing the jury that
plaintiff-respondent's burden required
a physician.

proof of causation through

Fundamental fairness and the interests of justice

require that plaintiff-respondent be awarded a new trial, and the
petition for a writ of certiorari be denied.
2.

Plaintiff-Respondent was Entitled to have the Jury
Instructed on His "Lost Chance of Survival" Theory.

The court of appeals correctly held that if the negligence of
the hospital prevented Betty George's doctors from diagnosing and
treating her condition, the jury could have found that failure to
be "a proximate cause of her worsened condition and ensuing
death."

[App.9]

supported

by

jurisdictions.

Here again, the court of appeals decision was

well

reasoned,

[App.8-9]

relevant

decisions

from

other

The law continues to trend in a

direction favoring "lost chance" causes of action, with logical
and fair reasoning.
In

Ehlinaer v. Sipes. 155 Wis.2d 1, 454 N.W.2d 754 (1990),

plaintiffs claimed a physician's negligent failure to diagnose the
existence

of

twins

resulted

in

their

injuries

at

birth.

Plaintiff's expert at trial stated that, had the existence of
twins been discovered, certain measures would have given the
mother a chance of prolonging her pregnancy, which may
prevented the subsequent injuries.

have

At the close of the evidence,

the physician was granted a directed verdict on causation which
14

was affirmed by the Wisconsin Circuit Court.

The Wisconsin

Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial,
based, in part, on the application of Restatement
Torts, §323
rationale

(1965) •

(Second) of

The Utah Court of Appeals used the same

in George v. LPS Hospital.

[App.8-9, fn.5]

The

Wisconsin Court's reasoning, equally applicable here included
We disagree that to establish causation the
Ehlingers must show that proper diagnosis and
treatment would have been successful. We conclude
that in a case of this nature, where the causal
relationship between the defendant's alleged
negligence and the plaintiff's harm can only be
inferred by surmising as to what the plaintiff's
condition would have been had the defendant
exercised ordinary care, to satisfy his or her
burden on causation, the plaintiff need only show
that the omitted treatment was intended to prevent
the very type of harm which resulted, that the
plaintiff would have submitted to the treatment,
and that it is more probable than not the treatment
could have lessened or avoided the plaintiff's
injury had it been rendered.
Causation is a question of fact.
emphasis in the original)

(Id.

at 759,

The Ehlinger court continued,
In a case such as presented here, where given the
nature of the malady and omitted treatment the
success of the treatment if instituted is not a
matter of reasonable certainty, we refuse to place
upon the injured plaintiff the burden of proving
what more probably than not would have happened had
the defendant not been negligent.
Greater uncertainty would be involved if an expert
were required to testify as to what more probably
than not would have happened had the defendant
rendered appropriate care. (Id. at 7 61)
Recall that one of the plaintiff-respondent's objections in
this case, not reached by the Court of Appeals, was that the
testimony of the hospital's "experts" on causation was completely
speculative and without foundation.
15

See

also,

Aasheim v. Humherger. 695 P.2d 824, 828 (Mont.

1985), which held,
We feel that including "loss of chance" within
causality recognizes the realities inherent in
medical negligence litigation.
People who seek
medical treatment are diseased or injured. Failure
to diagnose or properly treat denies the
opportunity to recover.
Including this lost
opportunity within the causality embrace gives
recognition to a real loss consequence of medical
failure.
In this case, LDS Hospital's negligence deprived Betty
George of any effective

treatment.

Depriving plaintiff-respondent

of a lost chance theory of recovery, would be tantamount to a
grant of immunity for the hospital's negligence, unless the George
family could produce speculative testimony regarding what the
result would have been had

that

negligence

not

occurred.

Such a

burden plainly would require proof of the unknowable.

The Utah

Court of Appeals was similarly troubled by the defense asserted by
LDS Hospital that, "our negligence made no difference."

The court

stated:
Such an argument is problematic.
It would be
unacceptable, for obvious policy reasons, to permit
hospitals or doctors to escape responsibility for
the negligent treatment of gravely ill persons upon
a showing that the patient's condition was terminal
and he or she was going to die anyway.
[App.7,
fn.4]
It is often said that the hospital staff are "the eyes and
ears"

of

the

treating

physicians.

The

hospital

staff

is

undoubtedly a necessary and vital link between a sick patient and
her opportunity to receive necessary diagnosis and treatment.

LDS

Hospital undertook to perform services for Betty George, who, in
turn, agreed to pay for them.

Thereafter, Betty George had a

right to expect that the hospital would exercise reasonable care
16

on her behalf regardless of the likelihood of benefit to be
derived.

LDS Hospital now takes the position that it should be

liable only for omissions which/ if undertaken/ would have had a
greater than 50% chance of success.
by the courts of this

statef

Such a positionf if endorsed

would declare open

season on

seriously ill patients/ since doctors and hospitals would be free
of

liability

for

the

grossest

malpractice

on

the

rather

hypocritical assertion that nothing they could have done would
have made a difference.
Patients like Betty George go to hospitals not only to
prevent

death/

but

also

to

avoid

associated with injury or disease.

or

lessen

the

suffering

A jury should be allowed to

decide whether a failure of a hospital to procure obviously
necessary medical assistance/ was a substantial factor in causing
subsequent injuries which appropriate medical treatment could
prevented or ameliorated.

have

The inclusion of that principle by the

court of appeals in this casef is amply supported both in logic
and law.

[App.7-9]

CONCLUSION
In Georae v. LDS Hospital, 142 U.A.R. 27 (Utah App. 1990)f a
routine negligence case against a hospital, the court of appeals
correctly perceived the issues, reversed/ and remanded the case
for a new trial based on
1.

The trial court's failure to instruct the jury on

plaintiff-respondent's

theory

of

the

case, which

was

well

supported by evidence and competent expert testimony; and
2.

Extremely prejudicial errors in instructing the jury

on plaintiff-respondent's burden of proof regarding causation/
17

which differed materially from the burden plaintiff-respondent had
been held to throughout the trial.
Since the court remanded the case for a new trial, it did not
reach several other reversible errors which were committed by the
trial court.
In its Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, LDS Hospital raises
legal issues not material to the court of appeal's decision, and
which even
remand.

if correct, would not effect the propriety

of the

Regardless, LDS Hospital is also incorrect on the law.

Plaintiff-respondent's negligence action against LDS Hospital did
not require expert physician testimony on causation.

Further, the

case is a classic example of one which should have been submitted
to the jury on a "lost chance" theory for recovery.
of the Utah

Court

of Appeals

renders

The decision

justice, and has

ample

support both in logic and the law.
WHEREFORE,

plaintiff-respondent

David George

respectfully

request that the Petition for Writ of Certiorari by LDS Hospital
be DENIED.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this LV

18

day of IvOl/lftbcr

, 1990.
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Before Judges Bench, Davidson, and Orme.
DAVIDSON, Judge:
Plaintiffs, the husband and heirs of decedent Betty
George, sought recovery in a wrongful death action against LDS
Hospital, Dr. Kimball Lloyd, and Dr. Michael Lahey. Plaintiffs
appeal from a jury verdict finding that defendant LDS Hospital
was negligent in its care of Mrs. George, but that defendant's
negligence was not a proximate cause of Mrs. George's death.
Dr. Lloyd and Dr. Lahey reached a settlement with the
plaintiffs prior to trial, although the doctors remained in the
case for purposes of determining comparative negligence. The
jury concluded that the doctors were not negligent and assigned
100 percent responsibility to the hospital.

Plaintiffs* motion for a new trial was denied by the trial
court. On appeal, plaintiffs claim that the trial court
committed reversible error in the jury instructions. We
reverse and remand for a new trial.
FACTS
On July 28# 1986$ Dr. Lloyd admitted Mrs. George to LDS
Hospital for a hysterectomy and exploratory surgery. The
surgery was performed on July 29 without apparent
complications. On the morning of July 30/ Dr. Lloyd ordered
that Mrs. George be ambulated four times daily# that she
receive incentive spirometry1 every hour while awake, and
that the nurses instruct her to cough and breathe deeply. This
treatment was intended to increase Mrs. George's breath
capacity, which is typically depressed following a patient's
abdominal surgery.
Mrs. George's breathing deteriorated during July 31. On
the morning of August 1/ Dr. Lloyd ordered that a chest X-ray
and lung profusion scan be taken to determine whether Mrs.
George had a pulmonary embolism. Although these tests proved
negative for a pulmonary embolism/ they did indicate the
possibility of bilateral atelectasis.2 In the early
afternoon of August 1# Dr. Lloyd called in Dr. Lahey and the
hospital's respiratory therapy department to assist him in
resolving Mrs. George's pulmonary condition.
Dr. Lloyd ordered that Mrs. George undergo an angiogram in
a further attempt to determine whether she had a pulmonary
embolism. Mrs. George was taken to the intensive care unit
(ICU) for an angiogram at 10:20 a.m. on August 2. The
angiogram was completed at about 1:00 p.m./ at which time Dr.
Lloyd learned that the test result for a pulmonary embolism was
negative.
A nurse found that Mrs. George was having difficulty
breathing, and that Mrs. George was incoherent upon returning
1. An incentive spirometer measures the volume of air entering
and leaving the lungs. Use of the device expands a patient's
diaphragm, while also providing an incentive for a patient to
breathe more deeply.
2. Atelectasis is the collapse of an expanded lung, resulting
in an insufficient flow of air to the lung's air sacs.

from ICU at 2:20 p.m. She did not inform Dr. Lloyd of this
condition. The charge nurse telephoned Dr. Lloyd at about 3:00
p.m. to inform him that Mrs. George had returned to OB/GYN from
ICU, but she also failed to notify Dr. Lloyd of Mrs. George's
deteriorating physical and mental condition.
At 3:00 p.m., another nurse took over the care of Mrs.
George. This nurse was a one-to-one special-duty nurse, whose
only assignment was to monitor Mrs. George's condition. At
about 3:30 p.m., a written notation was made in the chart that
Mrs. George was disoriented and incoherent. A second-year
resident physician was unable at this time to determine Mrs.
George's blood pressure and the nurses had difficulty making
Mrs. George bleed for a glucose test. Neither Dr. Lloyd nor
Dr. Lahey were informed of these adverse changes in Mrs.
George's condition.
At about 4:00 p.m., the resident physician telephoned Dr.
Lloyd to tell him that Mrs. George was febrile. Dr. Lloyd was
not informed during this conversation that Mrs. George
exhibited symptoms of hypoxia and he did not receive further
reports until being told of Mrs. George's cardiac arrest. Dr.
Lahey did not receive any further medical reports until 7:00
p.m., at which time he also was told that Mrs. George had
suffered a cardiac arrest.
The record indicates that the resident physician did not
visit Mrs. George between 5:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. The record
also shows that the special-duty nurse failed to continuously
monitor Mrs. George and to notify a supervisor of Mrs. George's
respiratory distress. Furthermore, the special-duty nurse was
not even in the room when Mrs. George stopped breathing and
suffered her first cardiac arrest.
Mrs. George stopped breathing in front of her visiting
daughter at about 7:00 p.m. The daughter then had to run out
of the hospital room in search of a nurse. A code was called
at 7:04 p.m., in which cardiopulmonary resuscitation was sought
for Mrs. George. Breathing assistance for Mrs. George was
initiated at about 7:13 p.m. During the interval between the
cessation of breathing and breathing assistance being
initiated, Mrs. George suffered a lack of oxygen to her brain.
Although her heart beat was reestablished, Mrs. George was
comatose after the cardiac arrest. Two days later, Mrs. George
died following a second cardiac arrest.

JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Two of the trial court's jury instructions are at issue in
this action. The court's Jury Instruction #16A provided:
The plaintiff in this case cannot recover
against the doctors or the hospital unless
it is proven, that,
1. Dr. Kimball Lloyd, Dr. Michael Lahey
or LDS Hospital's nursing staff or
respiratory therapist or all of them,
based on a degree of reasonable medical
probability, failed to exercise that
degree of reasonable care and skill in
caring for the plaintiff that was
ordinarily possessed and used by others in
the respective profession practicing in
1986 in Salt Lake City, Utah, or similar
communities under similar circumstances;
2. Based on a degree of reasonable
medical probability established through
expert medical testimony from a duly
qualified medical doctor, that such
failure, if any, was the proximate cause
of the death of Betiy George; and
3. That David George personally, and the
heirs of Betty George, and the
representative of the estate of Betty
George, was damaged by the negligence, if
any, of one of the defendants or all of
them.
If you do not find, by a preponderance of
the evidence, all of Lhe foregoing
propositions with regard to either Dr.
Kimball Lloyd, Dr. Michael Lahey or LDS
Hospital, the party or parties, as the
case may be, against whom any one
proposition is not found cannot be found
to have committed medical malpractice and
your verdict must be in favor of the
defendant or defendants. If you find that
the evidence is evenly balanced on any of
the above-mentioned issues, then your

i

verdict should be for the defendant or
defendants on whose behalf the evidence is
evenly balanced.
The court's Jury Instruction #21A provided:
You are instructed that where the
proximate cause of Betty George's death
and therefore the injury or loss claimed
by plaintiff is not established by a
preponderance of the evidence based on
reasonable medical probability from
testimony of a medical doctor, but is left
to conjecture or speculation and may be
reasonably attributed to causes over which
the hospital or doctor had no control or
responsibility/ then the plaintiff has
failed to sustain the burden of proof as
to proximate causation.
The jury returned a special verdict finding LDS Hospital
negligent in its care of Mrs. George, but not finding that the
negligence was a proximate cause of Mrs. George's death.
Plaintiffs claim on appeal that jury instructions #16A and #21A
prevented the jury from meaningfully considering the testimony
of plaintiffs' expert witnesses. Plaintiffs also claim that
jury instructions #16A and #21A precluded the jury from
awarding damages where the hospital's negligence was only a
contributing proximate cause of Mrs. George's death.
EXPERT WITNESSES
The trial court admitted the testimony of plaintiffs'
.expert witnesses, respiratory therapist Donald Owings and nurse
Harriett Gillerman, to explain the hospital's duty to Mrs.
George and the hospital's breach of this duty. Owings
testified that a respiratory therapist has a duty to notify a
physician or other supervisor if a patient does not respond to
respiratory therapy. Based on Mrs. George1s failure to respond
to the prescribed respiratory therapy, Owings offered his
expert opinion that the hospital's respiratory therapist
breached his duty by failing to notify the proper persons of
Mrs. George's deteriorating pulmonary condition.
Nurse Gillerman testified that ambulation and incentive
spirometry are used to prevent and treat atelectasis.

Gillerman offered her expert opinion that the nurses, in
failing to follow physician's orders to have Mrs. George
ambulated and to use incentive spirometry on August 1, thereby
breached their duty to her. Gillerman also testified that the
nurses breached their duty by failing to perform a neurological
assessment of Mrs. George when Mrs. George showed discernible
signs of respiratory distress or hypoxia and by failing to
timely notify the doctors of her rapidly deteriorating
condition.
Defendant counters that an expert witness cannot testify
about an area of medicine in which he or she is not personally
familiar. The record clearly indicates, however, that
Gillerman and Owings testified only to the standards of ^are in
their respective fields. The trial court recognized these
witnesses as experts and admitted their testimony, yet the
court, through the jury instructions, prevented the jury from
considering their testimony.3
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "[a]n appeal
challenging the refusal to give jury instructions presents
questions of law only. Therefore, we grant no particular
deference to the trial court's rulings.M Ramon By And Through
Ramon v. Farr, 770 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 1989). The parties in
this case dispute the trial court's conclusions of law as
stated in the jury instructions.
This court has stated that *[i]n medical malpractice
actions the plaintiff must provide expert testimony to
establish: 1) the standard of care, 2) defendants failure to
comply with that standard, and 3) that defendant caused
plaintiff's injuries." Hoooiiaina v. Intermountain Health
Care, 740 P.2d 270, 271 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citations
omitted); s&& Pisflorf v, BicKen, 612 P.2d 348, 351 (Utah
1980). Plaintiff's experts testified as to the hospital's
standard of care, the hospital's failure through its employees
to meet this standard, and Mrs. George's subsequent cardiac
arrest.
Courts have recognized that "[n]urses are specialists in
hospital care who, in the final analysis, hold the well-being,
3. This error was compounded by the court consistently stating
throughout trial that cause of death was not an issue in the
case and that expert testimony need not address that subject,
only to then give a jury instruction focusing on causation as
established by medical testimony.

in fact in some instances, the very lives of patients in their
hands.- Utter v. United H O S P . Center, Inc.. 236 S.E.2d 213,
216 (W.Va. App. 1977), reh'g denied (1977) (negligent failure
of nurses to observe plaintiff's condition). Courts have also
recognized that a nurse may have a duty to notify her
supervisor that a life-threatening situation exists and that
failure to perform this duty may be a proximate cause of
plaintiff's additional injury. See Campbell v. Pitt County
Memorial HOSP. Inc.. 352 S.E.2d 902, 908-9 (N.C. App. 1987).
The jury must be allowed to decide whether the hospital's
failure to notify the doctors of Mrs. George's change in
medical status, which may have indicated either hypoxia or
sepsis, was a breach of the duty owed to Mrs. George. Tne
trial court erred in not allowing the jury to base its decision
on the plaintiffs' expert testimony. See Karriaan v. Nazareth

ConventfrAcademy, ind#
5io P.2d 190, 196 (Kan. 1973), reh'g
1

denied (1973) (nurses delay in notifying physician of
plaintiff's condition); see also Darling v. Charleston
Community Memorial HOSP.. 211 N.E.2d 253, 258 (111. 1965),
reh.'a denied (1965) (nurses failed to recognize and inform
physician of change in patient's condition, where the condition
became irreversible within a matter of hours).
PROXIMATE CAUSE
According to the hospital pathologist, the combination of
atelectasis, pulmonary embolism, and sepsis probably led to
hypoxia and this, in turn, resulted in Mrs. George's first
cardiac arrest and subsequent death. Both parties agreed that
hypoxia and sepsis were significant contributing causes of Mrs.
George's death. Plaintiffs' and defendant's expert witnesses
also agreed that sepsis and pulmonary embolism, produce similar
symptoms.

Defendant argues that Mrs. George would inevitably have
died of sepsis after 2:20 p.m. on August 2, that her septic
condition was not caused by negligence, and that any negligence
on the hospital's part was therefore not a proximate cause of
Mrs. George's death.4 The medical record shows that sepsis
4. Such an argument is problematic. It would be unacceptable,
for obvious policy reasons, to permit hospitals or doctors to
escape responsibility for the negligent treatment of gravely
ill persons upon a showing that the patient1s condition was
terminal and he or she was going to die anyway.

was not diagnosed until August 3, the day after Mrs. George's
first cardiac arrest. Plaintiffs assert that the hospital's
negligent failure to notify Dr. Lloyd or Dr. Lahey of Mrs.
George's deteriorating condition at a minimum contributed to
her continued deterioration and may have hastened her death by
depriving her of the chance to receive earlier diagnosis and
treatment.
Although defendant asserts that Mrs. George's death due to
sepsis was inevitable, defendant's expert witness, Dr. Charles
Elliot, testified under cross-examination that sepsis may be
reversible. Dr. Lewis Weinstein, another of defendant's expert
witnesses, testified under cross-examination that sepsis may be
treatable, that sepsis did not occur instantaneously in Mrs.
George's case, and that prompt treatment of sepsis may
facilitate a patient's recovery. The record therefore does
support plaintiff's argument that the nurses' failure to notify
Dr. Lloyd or Dr. Lahey of Mrs. George's deteriorating condition
may well have prevented the doctors from timely diagnosing and
treating her.
"[E]vidence which shows to a reasonable certainty that
negligent delay in diagnosis or treatment increased the need
for or lessened the effectiveness of treatment is sufficient to
establish proximate cause." James v. United States. 483 F.
Supp. 581, 585 (N.D. Ca. 1980). Another court found the
defendant's assertion that operating upon the patient in a
timely manner would not have increased her chance of survival
unsupported by the record. Sfifi Hicks v. United States, 3 68
F.2d 626, 632 (4th Cir. 1966). The Hicks court concluded that
defendant's "negligence nullified whatever chance of recovery
she might have had and was the proximate cause of the death."
Id. at 633.
In a case where the chances of saving a patient's life
would have been increased if a physician had been timely
notified of the patient's condition, a court found that whether
the nonfeasance of the nurses was a contributing proximate
cause of death was a question of fact. See Goff v. Doctors
General Hoso. of San Jose. 333 P.2d 29, 33 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1958). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found error in a trial
court's jury instructions because of "the unmistakable
implication in this passage that defendant's negligence had to
be the sole cause of death in order to bring liability to the
defendant when, in fact, liability could attach if the
negligence of the defendant were but a substantial factor in
bringing about the death." Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280,

1289 (Pa. 1978) reh'g denied (1978)(original emphasis). Hamil
relied on the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323(a)(196575
as authority for the proposition that liability may be found
where negligence increases a party's risk of harm.
A jury could have reasonably concluded that the failure of
the nurses to notify Dr. Lloyd or Dr. Lahey of Mrs. George's
change in condition prevented them from diagnosing, treating,
and possibly saving her life and that this failure therefore
was a proximate cause of her worsened condition and ensuing
death. See Morris, The Negligent Nurse — The Physician and
the Hospital, 33 Baylor L.R. 109, 116 (1981) (the significance
of proximate cause as applied to a nurse's negligence). The
trial court's jury instructions therefore improperly implied
that the jury could find only one proximate cause of Mrs.
George's death.
Based upon the errors arising from the improper jury
instructions, we reverse and remand for a new trial against
defendant LDS Hospital. The verdict of no cause of action
against the defendant doctors is affirmed.

5. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323(1965) provides that:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for
consideration, to render services to
another which he should recognize as
necessary for the protection of the
other's person or things, is subject to
liability to the other for physical harm
resulting from his failure to exercise
reasonable care to perform his
undertaking, if (a) his failure to
exercise such care increases the risk of
such harm . . . .

Because we remand for new trial, it is unnecessary to reach
the other issues raised by appellant.

<^2lueJX^
Richard C. Davidson, Judge

WE CONCUR:

Russell W. Bench, Judge

Gregory K. Orme, Judge

ADDENDUM

II

The following portions of the record support appellant's position that
the trial court repeatedly ruled that proof
opposed to proof that the conduct
cause of the patient's initial
issue or irrelevant.

of the

cardiac

of the medical
hospital

arrest

staff

cause

of death

(as

contributed to the

on August 2, 1986) was not at

This section also demonstrates how the trial court

violated its own ruling.

After specifically instructing appellants' counsel

not to ask his experts their opinion on cause of death, the Court later
allowed respondent's experts, who were not involved with Mrs. George's care or
the determination of her cause of death, to testify on that subject.

The

narrow medical cause of death, separate and apart from the conduct of the
hospital staff as a contributing cause, became, in fact, the focus of
respondent's defense.
R-7 65 at 323-25:

(Testimony of appellant's expert Don Owings.)

Q. [Russell] Have you reviewed the autopsy report that is
included in the medical record in front of you, pages 3-10?
A. [Owings] Yes.
Q. Does that report contain any evidence that the patient
was indeed deprived of oxygen to the brain?
Mr. Burbidge:
for itself.
The Court:

Objection, your Honor.

The document speaks

It is in evidence isn't it?

Mr. Russell: No. Mr. Burbidge —
The Court:

The objection is sustained.

Q. Have you, in formulating the opinion that you just gave
us — that is, that the ventilatory assistance, the lack of
ventilatory assistance contributed to the coma and death—
did you rely in part on the autopsy?
A. Yes.

Q. What in that autopsy supports your opinion?
Mr. Burbidge:
The Court:

Sustained.

Mr. Russell:
The Court:

Objection, again, hearsay.

Your honor, an autopsy —

Would you like to approach the bench?

(An off-the-record discussion at the bench.)
The Court:

The objection is sustained.

Q. Mr. Owings, would you look at page 80 of the medical
record, which is Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1.
A.

Okay.

Q. Those records are blood gas reports?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you see the report at 7:12, at the bottom of the page?
A.

It says 1912.

Q.

That's 7:12

A.

Right.

Q.

That would be during the code procedure?

A.

According to the record, yes.

Q. What does that indicate about whether or not the patient
was receiving oxygen?
Mr. Burbidge:
The Court:

Objection, foundation.

Overruled.

A. It indicates that the patient is not ventilating, and
that their oxygen is below normal values, severely hypoxic.
Q.
Is that proof, in your opinion, that lack of oxygen
caused Mrs. George's arrest and death?
A. Yes.
Mr. Burbidge:
foundation.

Objection,

your Honor,

competency

and

The Court:

Sustained.

Is there a motion to strike?

Mr. Burbidge: Yes, your Honor.
The Court: Granted.
Mr. Burbidge: If we please the Court, could we have the
witness wait until an objection is entered, before the
response comes back?
The Court: The Court is going to take a five minute recess.
The Court will see counsel in chambers, on the record.
(The following proceedings occurred in chambers.)
The Court: The record will reflect that counsel and the
Court are in session, out of the presence of the jury. For
the record, the Court has previously ruled that the
cause of death may not be testified to except for
someone who in and official capacity participated
in determination of cause of death.
You may
proceed.
R-765 at 327
The Court: Is Counsel suggesting, by virtue of that
argument, that if cause of death becomes an issue, one who
signs a death certificate is competent to testify as to
cause of death?
Mr. Russell: Not necessarily, your Honor. I think there
would be a lot of circumstances where the person who signs
the certificate doesn't know. Was just told, wrote it down
and signed it.
The Court:

That's the Court's precise observation.

Mr. Russell:
The way I understand it, the Court is
requiring us to bring such a person in here to testify about
it. Mr. Owings, by his training and experience, can look at
the record, can look at the autopsy, and he knows — he can
form an opinion that lack of oxygen was the cause of death.
The Court:
Not the cause of death.
He had already
testified, and the Court has listened carefully to the
framing of the question and to the responsive answer. The
question was, did it contribute?
The answer was,
in his opinion, it did contribute.
There is
nothing wrong with the question nor the answer.
The
last question posed to the witness was, in your opinion, did
it cause the decedent's death?
It is an inappropriate
question, and the Court has previously ruled on it. That's
the reason the Court sustained the objection and granted the
motion to strike.

1 -*

R-765 at 328-331 - Conference in Chambers:
The Court:
The Court is not suggesting that, A,
cause of death is an issue in this case.
The Court
has never taken that position.
But if you contend
that it is an issue, . . .
Mr. Russell:

I don't think it is.

The Court:
I don't think
think it is an issue
contributing cause.

it is, either.
I don't
as
opposed to a

Mr. Burbidge: May I be heard on the matter, your Honor?
The Court: As opposed to a contributing cause.
Ms. Collard: We are talking about the cause as opposed to a
contributing cause?
The Court:
question.

The Court has permitted counsel to ask that

Mr. Russell: My concern is that when we get done with our
evidence, defense counsel is going to jump up and move for a
directed verdict because nobody has said that anything that
someone did caused or contributed to the cause of death. We
have that now through Mr. Owings and we will have it through
Nurse Gillerman. To tell you the truth, I an just unsure in
these discussion we have about whether the Court is saying,
in order to — because we do have the burden to prove
that, that violations of the standard of care
contributed to the cause.
The Court:
The record
with both of your expert
Mr. Russell:
The Court:

is replete at this
witnesses on that.

point

I want to make sure that —

Isn't it?

Mr. Russell:

I think so.

The Court: The Court is not suggesting to either Counsel
how they proceed with their case in chief or their defense
or rebuttal.
The Court is suggesting, in its own
opinion, the cause of death is not an issue. You
have talked all along in this case about standard of care,
and that's the basis that these two experts you have called
from Southern California have been designated or
acknowledged by the Court as experts. They are dealing with
the standard of care.
And they are perfectly within
their right as an expert witness to say if the

standard of care in not adhered to, I would expect
as an expert, that this is what would occur.
But
they can't say with specificity that that's in fact what did
happen to this particular woman.
Mr. Burbidge: May I be heard, please, your Honor?
The Court: Yes.
Mr. Burbidge:
I would move for a mistrial at this
time,
and
the
basis
of
the
motion
is
that
prejudicial testimony,
incompetent testimony,
and
testimony
without
foundation
has
come
in
with
regard to the cause of death and the contributing
causes of death.
In the State of Utah, medical doctors
are restricted —
such issues are restricted to the
testimony of medical doctors. They are the only authority
to treat and to diagnose. And the diagnostic function of a
medical doctor is the exclusive — or the determination of
cause of death or contributing cause of death is in the
exclusive province, pursuant to statute and case law, of
medical doctors. And the Court's ruling, allowing these
unqualified experts to testify as to a contributing cause of
death, is a prejudicial error that cannot be corrected
through any kind of instruction to this jury, and I would
move for a mistrial at this time, and request the Court give
direction to counsel for the plaintiff that he is not to
pursue that line of questioning with these witnesses again.
The Court:
The motion for mistrial is denied. The
Court has previously ruled that this witness nor
any other expert witness who was not involved in
determination
of cause
of death could not
so
testify.
And the Court has granted defense counsel's
motion to strike. Further, if there is a problem, and
should cause of death become an issue in this case, the
Court is of the opinion that the error made, if in fact it
occurred, is not prejudicial, and is curable.
Anything further?
Mr. Russell: No, your honor, thank you.
The Court:
The Court will, on the record instruct
counsel not to ask this witness nor any other
expert witness as to the decedent's caur.e of death,
who
did
not
participate
in
making
that
determination, so that there is no misunderstanding on
that part. And the Court has stated previously, on the
record, out of the presence of the jury, that that's the
Court's position, and so instructs counsel for the plaintiff
again.

NOTE:

Following the repeated assertions of this position, the Court

subsequently allowed Dr. Trowbridge, Dr. Weinstein and Dr. Elliot - none of
whom had provided any care to the patient, nor did they have any involvement
with the determination on cause of death - to offer their purely speculative
.opinions on that very subject.

Worse, in instructions 16A, 21A and the

Special Verdict Form, the Court required plaintiff to prove
through

a physician

or recover nothing.

the cause of

death

INSTRUCTION NO.

The plaintiff in this case cannot recover against the
doctors or the hospital unless it is proven, that,
1.

Dr. Kimball Lloyd, Dr. Michael Lahey or LDS

Hospital's nursing staff or respiratory therapist or all of
them, based on a degree of reasonable medical probability,
failed to exercise that degree of reasonable care and skill in
carirg for the plaintiff that was ordinarily possessed and used
by others in the respective profession practicing in 1986 in
Salt Lake City, Utah, or similar communities under similar
circumstances;
2.

Based on a degree of reasonable medical probability

established through expert medical testimony from a duly
qualified medical doctor, that such failure, if any, was the
proximate cause of the death of Betty George; and
3.

That David George personally, and the heirs of Betty

George, and the representative of the estate of Betty George,
was damaged by the negligence, if any, of one of the defendants
or all of them.
If you do not find, by a preponderance of the evidence,
all of the foregoing propositions with regard to either Dr.
Kimball Lloyd, Dr. Michael Lahey or LDS Hospital, the party or
parties, as the case may be, against whom any one proposition is
not found cannot be found to have committed medical malpractice
and your verdict must be in favor of that defendant or
17

defendants.

If you find that the evidence is evenly balanced on

any of the above-mentioned issues, then your verdict should be
for the defendant or defendants on whose behalf the evidence is
evenly balanced.

INSTRUCTION NO.

You are instructed that where the proximate cause of
Betty George's death and therefore the injury or loss claimed by
plaintiff is not established by a preponderance of the evidence
based on reasonable medical probability from testimony of a
medical doctor, but is left to conjecture or speculation and may
be reasonably attributed to causes over which the hospital or
doctor had no control or responsibility, then the plaintiff has
failed to sustain the burden of proof as to proximate
causation.
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Where the evidence demonstrated that the hospital staff

failed to alert physicians to changes in the medical condition of
Betty George requiring immediate medical diagnosis and treatment,
did the trial court commit reversible error by requiring appellant
to produce expert testimony as to causation?

Stated another way,

was this not a case "obvious to laymen", in which the jury could
have found negligence and causation without the necessity of
expert testimony?
2.

In a case alleging negligence against LDS Hospital, did

the trial court commit reversible error by instructing the jury
that proof of causation could only come from expert physicians, as
opposed to nursing and respiratory therapy experts?
3.

Did the trial court commit reversible error by failing or

refusing to submit to the jury, appellant's proposed instructions
which set forth his theory of the case, which was supported by
competent evidence?
4.

Did the trial court commit reversible error by inserting

the previously rejected instructions 16A and 21A into the final
set of instructions on the last day of trial, after both sides had
rested, immediately before closing argument?
5.

Did the trial court commit reversible error by overruling

appellant's objections that LDS Hospital's physician expert's
testimony as to causation was speculative, and without foundation?
In the same respect, did the trial court commit reversible error
when it violated

its own specific ruling, and allowing the

respondent's experts to testify as to cause of death.

6.

Did the trial court commit reversible error by denying

appellant's Motion for a Directed Verdict as to Dr. Lloyd and Dr.
Lahey?
7.

Lid the Special verdict form, submitted to the jury over

appellant's objections, constitute reversible error?
8.

Did the trial court's denial of appellant's right to

present rebuttal argument constitute prejudicial error?
9.

Did the trial court commit reversible error when it

denied appellant's motion for a new trial?
10.

Was it error for the trial court to award respondent

costs associated with the taking of depositions pursuant to Rule

54(d), Utah Rules Of Civil Procedure?
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DAVID GEORGE, et al.
SPECIAL VERDICT
Plaintiff,
vs.
KIMBALL LLOYD, M.D., MICHAEL
LAHEY, M.D., and INTERMOUNTAIN
HEALTH CARE, dba LDS HOSPITAL

Civil No. C-87-4199
Judge Pat Brian

Defendant.
At the end of each proposition submitted to you, indicate
your finding by placing an "X" in the appropriate line.

If

there'is preponderance of the evidence in favor of the
proposition, indicate by finding "yes."

If there is

preponderance of the evidence against the proposition, indicate
by finding "no."

If there is no preponderance of the evidence

either way on the proposition, indicate by answering "no."
We, the jury in this action, find the answers to the
questions propounded to us, as follows:
QUESTION NO. 1
A.

Was Dr. Kimball Lloyd negligent in his care of Betty

George?
ANSWER:

Yes

No

x

B.

If you answered "yes" to question No. 3A above, then

and only then answer the following question:

Was.the negligence

of Dr. Kimball Lloyd a proximate cause of the death of Betty
George Stnd the damages claimed by David George and the heirs of
Betty George?
ANSWER:

Yes

No
QUESTION NO. 2

A,

Was Dr. Michael Lahey negligent in his care of Betty

George?
ANSWER:B.

Yes

No

If you answered "yes" to question No. 2A above, then

and only then answer the following question:

Was the negligence

of Dr. Michael Lahey a proximate cause of the death of Betty
George and the damages claimed by David George and the heirs of
Betty George?
ANSWER:

Yes

No
QUESTION NO. 3

A.

Was LDS Hospital through its nursing staff and/or

respiratory therapists negligent in their care of Betty George?
ANSWER:
B.

Yes ^

No

If you answered "yes" to No. 3A above, then answer

the following question:

Was the negligence of LDS Hospital

including the nursing staff and/or the respiratory therapists, a

proximate cause of the death of Betty George and the damages claimed by
David George and the heirs of Betty George?
ANSWER:

Yes

No

X

If you answered f,nofl to question 3A or 3B, or if you found no
preponderance of the evidence either way, then answer no further questions.
QUESTION NO. 4
What is the amount of damages, if any, sustained by David George,.
and the heirs of Betty George and the estate of Betty George? This question
should be answered only if you answered f,yes" to question No. 3A and 3B.
General Damages
a. loss of consortium

$

b*

$

Pain and suffering of Betty George

Special Damages iiicluding:
ai

Funeral and Burial expenses

$

b. Medical expenses

$

c.

$

Lost income, benefits and household services
QUESTION NO. 5

Assessing a percentage only to a party or parties found negligent,
considering the negligence to amount to 100 percent, what percentage of
negligence is attributed to:
a. Dr. Kimball Lloyd

%

b.

%

Dr. Michael Lahey

c. LDS Hospital, its nurses
and/or respiratory therapists
%

Total
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100

%

Dated t h i s f c i a v

of

Ak

favuJiev

. 1988.
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fully tried and resulted in a verdict and judgment for the defendant, the court's later ruling
granting defendant's motion to dismiss was a
nullity and the plaintiff could not appeal therefrom but should base any appeal upon the verdiet and judgment and the rulings refusing to
P.2d 855 (1953).
—Splitting o f negligence and damages issues.
Judgment n.o.v. in favor of patient in personal injury action against hospital on the
question of negligence and ordering of new

trial to determine amount of damages was
proper since, in personal injury action, q\
tion of how accident happened, who was
fault, and pain and injury occasioned then
a r e ^ mterraingled that if trial is ordered,
f^mes* to both parties, it should be on atf
134

42?

p M

?36

Am. J u r . 2d. — 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments
§5 106 to 151; 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 463 et
i , «

*****.*,

.* ~~

—

« . . . « . ,
„
.
Cited in Collier v. Frerichs, 626 P.2d 47|
< U t e h 1 9 8 1 > ; J e P s e n v - Tenhoeve, 656 P.2d 4g
< U t »h 1 9 8 2 > ; Wilderness Bldg. Sys. v. C h j |
man, 699 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985).

fusal to direct verdict against him, 10 A.L.R34
1330.
Right to voluntary dismissal of civil actio!
***** * « « f t » S 6 A.L.R.3d 1113.
Key Numbers.—Judgment** 199; Trial
167 to 181.

direction of verdict on opening statement of
counsel in civil action, 5 A.L.R.3d 1405.
Propriety and prejudicial effect of counsel's
argument or comment as to trial judge's re-

Rule 51. Instructions to jury; objections.
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the court reasonably
directs, any party may file written requests that the court instruct the jury pn
the law as set forth in said requests. The court shall inform counsel of ita
proposed action upon the requests prior to instructing the jury; and it shall
furnish counsel with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless the parties
stipulate t h a t such instructions may be given orally or otherwise waive t h i |
requirement. If the instructions are to be given in writing, all objections
thereto must be made before the instructions are given to the jury; otherwise,
objections may be made to the instructions after they are given to the jury, but
before the jury retires to consider its verdict. No party may assign as error the
giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto. In object*
ing to the giving of an instruction, a party must state distinctly the matter to
which he objects and the grounds for his objection. Notwithstanding the fore-'
going requirement, the appellate court, in its discretion and in the interests of
justice, may review the giving of or failure to give an instruction. Opportunity
shall be given to make objections, and they shall be made out of the hearing of
the jury.
Arguments for the respective parties shall be made after the court has
.instructed the jury. The court shall not comment on the evidence in the case,
and if the court states any of the evidence, it must instruct the jurors that
they are the exclusive judges of all questions of fact.
(Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
Amendment N o t e s . — The 1986 amendment, in the first paragraph, deleted "during
the trial" following "time" in the first sentence,
made a minor punctuation change in the sec-

ond sentence, and inserted "of" in the next-tolast sentence; and substituted "jurors" for
^jury" in the second sentence in the second
paragraph.
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Compiler's Notes. — This section varies
-jbatantially from Rule 51, F.R.C P., after
^juch it is patterned.

Rule 51

Cross-References. — Exceptions unnecessary, Rule 46.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

(1967)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

8 €

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

ANALYSIS

Comments on evidence.
^Allowed and disallowed.
—proper.
——Accurate statement of facta.
Copy of instructions.
—Delay.
Meaning.
.-Entire context.
Hecessity of objections.
—Failure to object.
Appellate review.
— Burden of overcoming.
Court's failure to instruct.
Waiver.
—Opportunity to object.
Effect of denial.
—Purpose of rule.
—When made.
After jury retired.
Before jury retires.
During trial.
Oral instructions.
—Necessity.
—Preservation by court reporter.
Specific instructions.
—Comparative negligence.
Legal consequence of jury's findings.
—Contributory negligence.
Irrelevant instructions.
—Elements of criminal offense.
One instruction.
—Proximate cause and superseding cause.
—Refusing requested instructions.
Correct statement of law.
Unreliability of eyewitness identification.
—Theories of parties.
Instructions as a whole.
Supported by evidence.
—Unavoidable accident.
Specificity in objections.
—Cure
Later motions or briefs.
—Insufficient.
—Specificity required.
Explanation of grounds.
Written instructions.
—Failure to tender.
Waiver.
Cited.
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Comments o n e v i d e n c e .

urgently so demand. Williams v. Lloyd, HJ
Utah 2d 427, 403 P.2d 166 Q965).
The Supreme Court may, in its discretion
and in th > m e r e s t of justice, review the giving
or failure to give needed
structions even i|
the defense has failed to make request for inn
structions in writing. State v. Bell, 563 P.2$
186 (Utah 1977).

—Allowed a n d disallowed.
This rule does not prevent the trial court
from including in its instructions general
statements concerning certain types of evidence, nor concerning the burdens of proof and
the sometimes varying degrees of proof required; however, this rule does enjoin it from
commenting on the quality or credibility of the
evidence in such a way as to indicate that it
favors the claims or the position of either
party. State v. Sanders, 27 Utah 2d 354, 496
P.2d 270 (1972).

Burden of overcoming.
The burden of showing special circumstance*
which would warrant a departure from the rule
precluding appellate consideration of a claimed
error in giving or refusing of instructions not
objected to rests upon the party seeking to vary
from the rule. McCall v. Kendrick, 2 Utah 2d
364, 274 P.2d 962 (1954).
A party may not assign as error the giving or
the failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto, and the objection must be sufficiently specific to give the trial court notice of
the claimed error; while Supreme Court may in
its discretion and in the interests of justice review the giving or failure to give an instruction, it is incumbent upon the aggrieved party'
to present a persuasive reason to invoke such
discretion. E.A. Strout W. Realty Agency, Incr
v. W.C. Foy & Sons, 665 P.2d 1320 (Utah
1983).
Where plaintiff did not object below, it cannot raise the failure to give special verdicts or
interrogatories on appeal where plaintiff has
not met its burden of showing special circumstances warranting such a review. Cambelt
Int'l Corp. v. Dalton, 69 Utah Adv. Rep. *
(1987).

—Proper.
In suit for damages for false representations,
where one of plaintiffs was a director of defendant company, the trial court's outlining to the
jury of the duties of a director was not improper. Douglas v. Duvall, 5 Utah 2d 429, 304
P.2d 373 (1956).
Accurate statement of facts.
In suit for damages arising out of a truck
accident, instructions relating to the effect of
meeting a n automobile a t nighttime and stating t h a t the burning lights on an oncoming
automobile obscure objects behind it, included
an accurate statement of facts susceptible of
judicial knowledge as a matter of law and was
not comment on the evidence or expression of
opinion. Federated Milk Producer's Ass'n v.
Statewide Plumbing & Heating Co., 11 Utah
2d 295, 358 P.2d 348 (1961).
Copy of instructions.

—Delay.
The furnishing of a copy of the instructions
to counsel is a convenience and courtesy to him
and, where there may have been some delay,
but counsel did get his copy during the time
the instructions were being given and used the
same in taking his exceptions, the delay in furnishing a copy would not be ground for reversal. Hanks v. Christensen, 11 Utah 2d 8, 354
P.2d 564 (1960).

Court's failure to instruct.
Where defendant submitted no instruction to
the court, claim of error as to court's failure to
instruct as to "practical acceptance" was without merit. Romrell v. W.W. Clyde & Co., 534
P.2d 867 (Utah 1975).
Although the trial court in a prosecution for
theft could have instructed on the value of the
property taken, its failure to do so in the absence of a written request did not warrant reversal. State v. Erickson, 568 P.2d 750 (Utah
1977).

Meaning.
—Entire context.
Instructions should be read in their entire
context and given meaning in accordance with
the ordinary and usual import of the language
as it would be understood by lay jurors.
Brunson v. Strong, 17 U t a h 2d 364, 412 P.2d
451 (1966).
Necessity of objections.
—Failure to object.
Appellate review.
A review of error as to the giving or failure
to give a n instruction where no objection was
made will be done only under unusual circumstances and where the interests of justice

Waiver.
Where plaintiff failed to make an objection
to trial court's refusal to give requested instruction to jury, Supreme Court would not review refusal on appeal. Beck v. Dutchman Coalition Mines Co., 2 Utah 2d 104, 269 P.2d 867
(1954).
Where objections urged on appeal were not
urged in the trial court they were not considered by the Supreme Court. Steele v. Wilkinson, 10 Utah 2d 159, 349 P.2d 1117 (1960).
Plaintiffs who failed to object to jury instruction at time of trial were precluded from rais-
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Rule " ,

may be pointed out. State v. Cowan, 26 Utah
2d 410, 490 P.2d 890 (1971)

ing issue on appeal. Morgan v. Pistone, 25
Utah 2d 63, 475 P.2d 839 (1970).
Where e o p t i o n s to instructions were taken,
by agree
i of court and counsel, after jury
had been
cructed and had retired to deliberate, and defendant failed to request instruction
on entrapment, trial court was justified in not
including such an instruction. State v. Cowan,
26 Utah 2d 410, 490 P.2d 890 (1971).
In order for a party to take advantage of a
failure to give a correct instruction, he must
have proposed a correct instruction and objected to the trial court's failure to give it.
Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354 (Utah 1975).
A party may not assign as error the giving of
or failure to give an instruction unless they
object thereto before the jury retires to consider
its verdict. Black v. McKnight, 562 P.2d 621
(Utah 1977).
Even if requested instruction should have
been given, plaintiff could not complain of the
failure to give it for the reason t h a t he did not
except to the court's failure to give t h a t particular instruction. Jensen v. Eakins, 575 P.2d
179 (Utah 1978).

Before j u r y retires.
The primary purpose of the requirement that
objections to instructions be made "before the
jury retires to consider its verdict" is that if the
objections call attention to error, correction
may be made before the jury goes to deliberate.
Hill v. Cloward, 14 Utah 2d 55, 377 P.2d 186
(1962).
During trial.
The trial judge should be allowed considerable latitude of discretion with respect to ..ie
mechanics of procedure, and should not be held
in error for requiring counsel to submit proposed instructions during the course of the
trial and before he rested his case. Hanks v.
Christensen, 11 Utah 2d 8, 354 P.2d 564
(1960).
Oral instructions.

—Opportunity to object.
Effect of denial.
The parties have a right to make objections
to the instructions to preserve challenges to
their accuracy, but under the rule that, if a
party has no opportunity to object, the absence
of an objection does not thereafter prejudice
him if counsel was prevented from making objections to instructions, he should be deemed to
have done so. Hanks v. Christensen, 11 Utah
2d 8, 354 P.2d 564 (1960).
Any error in court's failure to give counsel
opportunity to object to instructions was harmless error where no showing was made that
any instruction was improper. Pagan v. Thrift
City s Inc., 23 U t a h 2d 207,460 P.2d 832 (1969).
—Purpose of rule.
Purpose of requiring t h a t trial court instructions be objected to in order to preserve any
error on appeal is to give the trial court an
opportunity to correct any errors or fill any inadequacies in the instructions given so that the
jury may consider the case on the proper basis;
in order to accomplish t h a t purpose, the Rule
should be strictly enforced unless to do so
would create a substantial likelihood of injustice. State v. Kazda, 545 P. 2d 190 (Utah 1976);
State v. Schoenfeld, 545 P.2d 193 (Utah 1976).
—When made.
After jury retired.
Common practice of taking exceptions to instructions after jury has been instructed and
retired to deliberate is ill advised because it
gives trial court and opposing counsel no opportunity to correct errors or omissions which

—Necessity.
It is sometimes necessary to instruct a jury
orally in order to answer problems which are
essential to the jury's having a clear view of
the evidence and the issues as the trial proceeds. Weber Basin Water Conservancy Dist.
v. ' e e n , 8 Utah 2d 79, 328 P.2d 730 (1958).
—Preservation b y court reporter.
There is no error in giving an oral instruction to the jury when the instruction is taken
down and preserved by the court reporter.
State v. Pace, 527 P.2d 658 (Utah 1974).
Specific i n s t r u c t i o n s .
—Comparative negligence.
L e g a l c o n s e q u e n c e of j u r y ' s findings.
The main function of a jury is (to be a fact
finder; and, in a comparative negligence case
tried under Idaho law, it would have been prejudicial error to instruct the ju t asfcothe effect
of its findings on the outcome of the case
McGinn v. Utah Power & Light Co., 529 P 2d
423 (Utah 1974).
If requested, a trial court must inform th€
jury of the legal consequences of apportioning
to the plaintiff 50% or more of the negligence il
finds in a comparative negligence case, if the
effect of such an instruction will not be to con
fuse or mislead the jury. Dixon v. Stewart, 65*
P.2d 591 (Utah 1982).
—Contributory negligence.
Irrelevant instructions.
Where the trial court took the question o
the plaintiffs contributory negligence from th<
jury because he was only six years old bu
then, in other instructions on proximate cause
made reference to the effect of "the acts am
omissions of two or more persons" rnd 'th<
negligent acts of two or more persons," ever
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though there was some justification for the
charge that irrelevant instructions were given,
the issues were presented to the jury fully and
fairly and there was no prejudice to the rights
of the plaintiff Hadley v. Wood, 9 Utah 2d 366,
345 P.2d 197 (1959).

—Unavoidable accident.
An instruction on unavoidable accidents, in
most cases, is superfluous in view of the other
instructions which are given covering the basic
issues in accident cases. Wellman v. Noble, 12
Utah 2d 350, 366 P.2d 701 (1961).

—Elements of criminal offense.

Specificity in o b j e c t i o n s .

One instruction.
All the elements of the charged crime need
not necessarily be included in one instruction,
though the better practice is to do so; so long as
the jury is informed what each element is and
t h a t each must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, the instructions taken as a whole may
be adequate even though the essential elements are found in more than one instruction.
State v. Laine, 618 P.2d 33 (Utah 1980).

—Cure.

—Proximate c a u s e and superseding c a u s e .
In case where plaintiff was injured while riding as passenger in jeep that collided with defendant's bus, it was improper for trial court to
instruct j u r y t h a t the jeep driver was the sole
proximate cause of the accident if he was negligent in failing to see the bus, since defendant's
negligence was not superseded by any negligence on t h e part of t h e jeep driver if the latter's negligence was foreseeable. Harris v.
Utah Tranwit Auth., 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 1983).
—Refusing requested instructions.
C o r r e c t s t a t e m e n t of law.
The triaS court may properly refuse to give
requested instructions correctly stating the
law when t heir substance is given in the instructions cif the court. Hardman v. Thurman,
121 U t a h 143, 239 P.2d 215 (1951).
Unreliability of e y e w i t n e s s identification.
Trial court, in a criminal prosecution did not
err in refusing to give a requested instruction
cautioning t h e jurors about the unreliability of
eyewitness identification. State v. Sanders, 27
Utah 2d 3£4, 496 P.2d 270 (1972).
—Theories of parties.
Instructions a s a w h o l e .
It is the d u t y of the trial court to cover the
theories of both parties in its instructions. In
determining whether the court adequately discharged thi's duty and fairly presented the issues to the jury, the instructions must be considered aft a whole. Startin v. Madsen, 120
Utah 631, 237 P.2d 834 (1951).
Supported by evidence.
Parties are entitled to have their theories of
the case presented to the jury in the form of
instructions only if they are supported by the
evidence Powers v. Gene's Bldg. Materials,
Inc., 567 P 2d 174 (Utah 1977).

L a t e r m o t i o n s o r briefs.
Expansion on non-specific objections in a motion for a new trial or in a brief on appeal does
not cure the lack of timeliness in making
proper objections to the trial court. Beehive
Medical Elecs., Inc. v. Square D Co., 669 P.2d
859 (Utah 1983).
—Insufficient.
"On the grounds and for the reasons t h a t
such instruction is not supported by, and is
contrary to, the law and the evidence" does not
comply with the requirements of this Rule.
Employers' Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Allen Oil Co.,
123 Utah 253, 258 P.2d 445 (1953).
Objection to instruction on grounds that it is
confusing, misleading, and contrary to the law
fails to point out with the requisite degree of
particularity wherein the instruction erred;
since the purpose of the rule is to direct the
attention of the court to any errors in the instruction, the objecting party must state distinctly the matter to which he objects and the
grounds of his objection. Redevelopment;
Agency v. Barrutia, 526 P.2d 47 (Utah 1974).
In order to assign as error the giving of a n
instruction, a party must object to the instruction, and the objection must be specific enough
to give the trial court notice of the very error in
the instruction of which t h e party complains;'
objections stating t h a t an instruction "is not a
correct statement of the law involving the
case" and t h a t instructions are "not supported
by any evidence in t h e record" are not specific
enough to put the trial court on notice of the
claimed error. Beehive Medical Elecs., Inc. v.
Square D Co., 669 P.2d 859 (Utah 1983).
Objection failed to meet t h e requirements of
this rule where it pointed to different paragraph of instruction t h a n t h a t challenged on
appeal and where objection merely stated that
the instruction was "not a correct statement of
law" without citing code section it later relied
on, in appeal, without specifying with particularity the ground for objection. Godesky v.
Provo City Corp., 690 P.2d 541 (Utah 1984).
An objection couched in language such as
"the instruction is not suggested by and is contrary to law," or like terms, lacks the specificity required by this rule. Morgan v. Quailbrook
Condominium Co., 704 P.2d 573 (Utah 1985).
—Specificity r e q u i r e d .
An objection to an instruction should be spe-
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ler v. Zinik Sporting Goods Co., 538 P.2d
(Utah 1975).
Cited in Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d
366 P.2d 701 (1961); Hill v. Cloward, 14 1
2d 55, 377 P.2d 186 (1962); Ortega v. Tho
14 Utah 2d 296, 383 P.2d 406 (1963); Mei
Christensen, 15 Utah 2d 182, 389 P.2d
(1964); Memmott v. United States Fuel Co
Utah 2d 356, 453 P.2d 155 (1969); Telfoi
Newell J. Olsen & Sons Constr. Co., 25 I
2d 270, 480 P.2d 462 (1971); Flynn v. ^
Harlin Constr. Co., 29 U t a h 2d 327, 509 i
356 (1973); McGinn v. Utah Power & L
Co., 529 P.2d 423 (Utah 1974); Henderso
Meyer, 533 P.2d 290 (Utah 1975); Lamki
Lynch, 600 P.2d 530 (Utah 1979); State v. I
671 P.2d 201 (Utah 1983); Highland Cor
Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 683 P.2d 1042 (L
1984); Gill v. Timm, 720 P.2d 1352 (L
1986); Penrod v. Carter, 737 P.2d 199 (L
1987); King v. Fereday, 739 P.2d 618 (U
1987).

cific enough to bring to the attention of the
court all claimed errors in the instructions and
to give the court an opportunity to correct
them if the court deems it proper. Employers'
Mut Liab. Ins. Co. v. Allen Oil Co., 123 Utah
253, 258 P.2d 445 (1953).
_ — E x p l a n a t i o n of grounds.
To appeal the giving or the refusal of an instruction, a party must properly object to the
instructions in the trial court and explain its
grounds, with specificity, for challenging the
instructions. Morgan v. Quailbrook Condominium Co., 704 P.2d 573 (Utah 1985).
Written instructions.
-^Failure to tender.
.—-Waiver.
Where plaintiff had failed to tender a written instruction on burden of proof he could not
claim error in the lack of such instruction. Ful-

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. J u r . 2d. — 75 Am. J u r . 2d Trial § 573
et seq.
C.J.S. — 88 C J . S . Trial §§ 266 to 448.
A.L.R. — Propriety and prejudicial effect of
instructions in civil case as affected by the
manner in which they are written, 10 A.L.R.3d
501.
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury
action, to prove future pain and suffering and
to warrant instructions to jury thereon, 18
A.L.R.3d 10.
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury
action, to prove impairment of earning capacity and to warrant instructions to jury thereon,
18 A.L.R.3d 88.
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury
action, to prove permanence of injuries and to
warrant instructions to jury thereon, 18
A.L.R.3d 170.
Propriety and effect, in eminent domain proceeding, of instruction to the jury as to landowner's unwillingness to sell property, 20
A.L.R.3d 1081.
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case

stressing desirability and importance of agi
ment, 38 A.L.R.3d 1281.
Verdict-urging instructions in civil c
commenting on weight of majority view or
thorizing compromise, 41 A.L.R.3d 845.
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case
monishing jurors to refrain from intransigei
or reflecting on integrity or intelligence of
rors, 41 A.L.R.3d 1154.
Construction of statutes or rules maki
mandatory the use of pattern or uniform i
proved jury instructions, 49 A.L.R.3d 128.
Necessity and propriety of instructing on
temative theories of negligence or breach
warranty, where instruction on strict liabil
in tort is given in products liability case,
A.L.R.3d 102.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, constn
tion and effect of provision in Rule 5 1 , and si;
ilar state rules, t h a t counsel be given opport
nity to make objections to instructions out
hearing of jury, 1 A.L.R. Fed. 310.
Key Numbers. — Trial •=» 182 to 296.

Rule 52, Findings by the court.
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with a
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately il
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rul
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall sim
larly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute th
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes c
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be givei
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